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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
various stages, and in conformity to the adopted rules of procedure.
But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights
are secured although such matter may or may not be depending
in court."
The court also noted the extreme difficulty of separating law
from accounting in the field of tax law, but steadfastly held that the
question of the net operating loss was a legal question, and main-
tained that, while accountants may ordinarily fill out tax returns,
when a legal question arises, they cannot attempt to deal with it.
For, in this area, "A service performed by one individual for
another, even though it be incidental to some other occupation, may
entail a difficult question of law which requires a determination
by a trained legal mind."
The West Virginia definition of the practice of law would seem
to be of little or no help in making determinations in this area, and
this provokes a final question as to the purpose such a definition
should serve. Should it attempt to cover all possible fact situations
under which the problam could arise, or should it provide a broad
structure upon which each case would be decided on its particular
facts? The present definition is of the latter type, and it is the
opinion of the writer that this is the only practical answer. A defi-
nitioL of the former type could possibly be contained in a multi-
volume treatise, scarcely less, and would have to be revised and
rewritten every time a clever layman discovered a heretofore undis-
covered way to practice law.
T. J. W.
THE DocmEn OF SECONDARY MEANNmG
The Doctrine of Secondary Meaning was developed by courts
of equity prior to the existence of trade mark acts in order to afford
protection to manufacturers and producers from "palming off" by
competitors attempting to profit on an established reputation. A
concrete example may help to clarify the problem. Suppose A, a
manufacturer of ball point pens has, over a period of time, con-
sistently used a particular marking on the barrels of his pens. B,
a new-comer in the field begins to use the exact same marking on
his pens. It is readily apparent that individuals purchasing pens
from a retailer may purchase a pen of B's thinking that it was the
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product of A since the pen carried the distinct mark of A. Even
in the absence of any trade mark act if A's mark had acquired a
secondary meaning in the eyes of the purchasing public in that they
associate the mark with A's product, A has an equitable remedy
against B.
The Doctrine of Secondary Meaning was concisely defined by
Judge Denison' when he stated that,
"The secondary meaning theory... contemplates that a
word or phrase originally, and in that sense primarily, incapable
of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the
market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might
nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one
producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to
that branch of the purchasing public the word or phrase had
come to mean that the article was his product; in other words,
had come to be, to them, his trade-mark. So it was said that
the word had come to have a secondary meaning."
This definition would be most comprehensive and complete if it
had included the area of nonfunctional features, because the Sec-
ondary Meaning Doctrine is not limited to a word or phrase acquir-
ing a secondary meaning but may, as we shall see, attach to the
nonfunctional features of products.
This writer will attempt to enumerate the various elements the
courts have considered in ascertaining the existence or nonexistence
of a secondary meaning in relation to a word, phrase, or nonfunc-
tional feature (mark) concerning one's product. Attention will also
be given to the remedy one has against infringement after a sec-
ondary meaning has been acquired, and the limitations of the
doctrine.
In determining whether a secondary meaning has been ac-
quired, it is generally held that the following are to be considered:2
I. The length of time that the word, phrase, or mark has been
used by the manufacturer or producer
Generally, the acquisition of a secondary meaning does not
occur suddenly but is acquired after a long period of continued
user.3 However, there are instances where although there was
IMerriam v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 869 (6th Cir. 1912).
2 Cf. Time, Inc. v. Life Television Corp., 123 F. Supp. 470 (D.C. Minn.
1954).
3 Upjohn Co. v. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1920).
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such continued user, a secondary meaning never came into exist-
ence.4 For instance, it often occurs that the word, phrase, or mark
is so descriptive of an entire field of business that it is never trans-
formed into a mark of identification of a particular product. In
such a situation the period of time the word, phrase, or mark was
employed would be immaterial as to the creation of any rights in a
particular manufacturer or producer. Thus, it may be said that
while the element of time has some bearing on the creation of a
secondary meaning as to a particular product, it is by no means
conclusive.
II. Nature and extent of advertising
The extent to which the word, phrase, or mark is advertised
will have a definite effect on the creation of a secondary meaning. The
more intense the advertising campaign, the more probably a sec-
ondary meaning will evolve, in that the public will tend to associate
the word, phrase, or mark with the product of the particular pro-
ducer with which they most often see and hear it, thereby creating
a definite, sensual relationship between the word, phrase, or mark
and a particular product. Here again, however, the fact that there
has been an extensive advertising campaign is not conclusive. 5 See-
ondary meaning is not proven simply by reference to advertising
campaigns but it is simply another element to consider.6
III. Prior user
In the usual case a word, phrase, or mark will acquire a sec-
ondaty meaning for the first producer or manufacturer who ap-
propriates its use in point of time. This logically follows as he has
the longer period of user which, as mentioned above, has a decided
effect on the creation of a secondary meaning and will normally
start proceedings against the junior user before he can validly claim
that any secondary meaning has attached to his product. However,
once again it is apparent that the element of prior user could not
be conclusive in every case as to who has or has not acquired a
secondary meaning in relation to his product.
It is conceivable that under certain circumstances the junior
user may be the first to acquire a secondary meaning in relation to a
4 Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Food Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (D.C.D.
Neb. 1.943).
5 A. & H. Transp. Inc. v. Saveway Stations, Inc., 214 Md. 325, 135 A.2nd
298 (1957).
6 Ibid.
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word, phrase, or mark. Consequently, the mere use of a word,
phrase, or mark prior to a subsequent user will create no rights in
the senior user unless a secondary meaning has actually developed.7
In the last analysis it may be stated that while all of the foregoing
elements have a definite bearing on the existence of a secondary
meaning in relation to a particular person's product, whether such
meaning actually exists will depend on public association of the
word, phrase, or mark with a particular producer.
The next problem that concerns us is once one has acquired a
secondary meaning concerning his product, what is the nature of
his right and what protection is afforded? It has been said that
once a secondary meaning is established by a preponderance of the
avidence, it will be protected as a property right.8 It is clear that
the doctrine constitutes the creation of intangible property rights
in that before the secondary meaning attached, the property right
was nonexistent.
The protection offered the possessor, once a secondary mean-
ing is established, is based on a common law right existing separate
and apart from any trade mark act.9 It would seem that insofar as
secondary meaning does create a property right a showing of fraud
or unfair competition would be unnecessary in order to enjoin its
exploitation by another. If this were not so a property right could
easily be destroyed or unwillingly "transferred" to another by his
own wrongful conduct.
The legal means of protecting one's rights under the Secondary
Meaning Doctrine is by an injunction forbidding its use10 which
may or may not be accompanied by consequential damages. Such
relief prevents the "palming off" of goods as those of another, decep-
tion of the public, and trading on a reputation established by
another.11
It is important to note some of the limitations and conditions
bearing on the Doctrine of Secondary Meaning:
(A) If, in the first instance, the word, phrase, or mark was
unlawfully appropriated, the existence of a secondary meaning is
7 Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1951).
8 Case cited note 8 supra.
9 Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 805 U.S. 815(1988).
10 Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 109 F.2d 85 (App.
D.C. 1989).
11 Eisenstadt Mfg. Co. v. J. M. Fisher Co., 232 Fed. 957 (D.C. R. I.
1916).
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no justification for its continued use,' 2 and such unlawful user
will be enjoined.
(B) The exclusive right to use the word, phrase, or mark
only extends to the area of its popularity. 13
The second limitation is based on the proposition underlying
the entire theory of secondary meaning, that is, a certain segment
of the buying public associates the word, phrase, or mark with
the product of a certain producer and consequently no secondary
meaning and therefore no property rights exists beyond the limits
of the business area of the possessor. It is believed that one who
has acquired a secondary meaning in relation to his product should
be protected beyond the actual limits of his business area to the
extent of the area in which it is not unreasonable to assume his
business may someday expand. Consequently, this would eliminate
any infringement on the good will of an expanding business and
prevent "palming off" by competitors.
(C) Secondary meaning can not extend to the area of func-
tional features of a product.14
]It would seem that this is a reasonable limitation in that a
producer can not be expected to forego a superior product in favor
of an inferior one because a prior producer had acquired a second-
ary meaning as to a functional element of his product. These mat-
ters are more properly protected under trade mark acts.
However, it is well settled that a nonfunctional feature of a
product can acquire a secondary meaning which will be protected
against an impingement by others. 15 The cases are in conflict as
to what extent one may copy the nonfunctional features of an-
other's products and the effect secondary meaning has on such
appropriation.
The majority view holds that one may copy the nonfunctional
features of another's product so long as they have not become so
associated with one user to have acquired a secondary mean-
1' Neva-Wet Corp. of America v. Never Wet Processing Corp., 277 N.Y.
163, 13 N.E.2d 755 (1938).
-13 Cohen v. Nagle, 190 Mass. 4, 76 N.E. 276 (1906).
14 Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (6th Cir. 1912).
15 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kelborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2nd Cir.
1917).
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ing.16 However, there are cases which forbid any imitation of
nonfunctional features. 17
It is believed that one should be allowed to copy nonfunctional
features that have not acquired a secondary meaning unless it be
established that such use was intended for the purpose of "palming
off" a subsequent user's product for that of the original users so as
to deceive the public and injure the business of the originator.
Some cases have indicated that when one copies well-known non-
functional features of another's product that the court may assume
that the infringer intended to "palm off" his product as that of the
originator's.18 Such an assumption, however, would be without
basis in many cases and consequently, an inference of this nature
should not be so readily inferred, but should be made the subject
of proof. It has also been held that the imitation by one manufac-
turer of the goods of another in name, appearance, marking, and
color of packages, even if such similarities singly would not be
unlawful if accompanied by good faith, may collectively constitute
"unfair competition" where there is an actual purpose to deceive
and defraud purchasers. 19
In conclusion, it is apparent that the equitable Doctrine of
Secondary Meaning in conjunction with the trade mark acts affords
industry adequate protection against unscrupulous competitors and
deters public deception which would otherwise go unchecked.
G. H. A.
16 Ibid.
l7 Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2nd
Cir. 1908).
18 Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 Fed. 240 (2nd Cir.
1904).19 Case cited note 14 supra.
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